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SYMPOSIUM 1999 
Women, Equity and Federal Tax Policy: Open 
Questions 
Forum on Married Women and the Income Tax: 
Marriage Penalties and Marriage Bonuses 
of the 10Sth Congress 
Panel I: 
Observing Money, Marriage and Taxation 
Professor Ann F. Thomas 
PROF. THOMAS: Marriage penalties and marriage bonuses 
in income the tax are in the news but they are not new. 1 Indeed, even 
in the halcyon days of individual income tax returns, between 1913 
and 1948, there was often a marriage penalty in the form of a married 
couple's shared personal deduction. In 1913 married couples shared a 
personal deduction of $4,000 and unmarried individuals and spouses 
living apart were each entitled to their own $3,000 personal 
deduction.2 Sole earner married couples received a marriage bonus of 
a $10 tax savings and dual income couples paid a marriage penalty of 
$20. 
Naturally, people complained about this and, interestingly, 
they called it a marriage penalty. Conservatives described it as anti-
marriage and feminists said it devalued women? However, marriage 
penalties remained a feature of the income tax for much of that period. 
I See, e:g., Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Tcixation and the Family, 27 
STAN. L. REv. 1389, 1429-31 (1975) (describing the marriage penalty as it operated after 
1971). 
2 See, e.g., Tariff Act of October 3, 1913,38 Stat. 114, 168 (codified as I.R.C. 
§ I1A (1913)). 
3 For a modem restatement of these views see Ben Wildavsky, Richer or 
Poorer, NAT'L J., Aug. 15, 1998, at 1916 (describing the social conservative's concern 
that the marriage penalty is "anti-marriage"); see also Llewelyn H. Rockwell, Jr., Resort 
to Income Splitting, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1998, at Al2 (describing the feminist view 
that the marriage penalty is unfair to women). 
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Today we have even more varieties of marriage penalties and bonuses 
than ever before, and the numbers look very different. 
Dr. O'Neill has outlined the numbers for us. The magnitude 
of the penalty and bonus issue is considerable; with about $33 billion 
in marriage penalties, and $41 billion in marriage bonuses in the 
aggregate each year, most married couples in the United States are 
affected by this aspect of the income tax.4 This is, obviously, an 
important question. Moreover, it is one that requires a multi-
disciplinary approach to resolve. One of our goals in putting together 
this symposium is to stimulate and support a dialogue between social 
scientists and legal scholars working on marriage penalty and 
marriage bonus issues. Tax law does not hold all the answers and 
economics does not hold the entire answer either, but together we can 
talk about what the issues are and what the possible solutions are. 
The format for our panel will be as. follows: the Moderators 
will make brief introductions and each panelist will have about ten 
minutes to speak. Then, after all members of the panels have had 
their say, the Moderator will start some questions and let the panelists 
talk to each other and then open questions to the floor. 
Our first Panel this morning has, primarily, a social science 
focus, looking at some of the assumptions about financial behavior 
within marriage that underlie our current structure of taxation for 
married couples. We are going to move right into the first panel 
presentation and hear first from Leslie Whittington, who is an 
economist. Leslie is an Associate Professor of Public Policy at 
Georgetown University in Washington D.C. Along with co-author 
James AIm, she has written a very influential series of papers and 
articles about tax policy and marriage behavior of different kinds.5 
4 See Proposals to Reduce Taxes: Hearings Before the Committee on Ways 
and Means, 105th Congo (forthcoming) (1998) (statement of June E. O'Neill, Director of 
the Congressional Budget Office), available in <www.house.gov/ways_means/fullcomm/ 
testimony/2-4-98/2-onei.htm> (visited Oct. 14, 1999) (showing that a majority of couples 
filing joint 1996 returns was affected by either a marriage bonus or penalty) (hereinafter 
Proposals to Reduce Taxes). 
5 See, e.g., James AIm and Leslie A. Whittington, The Rise and Fall and Rise 
... of the Marriage Tax, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 571 (1996); see also James AIm & Leslie A. 
Whittington, Income Taxes and the Marriage Decision, in ApPLIED ECON 25, Jan. I, 1995, 
(Chapman and Hall 1995); see also James AIm and Leslie A. Whittington, Does the 
Income Tax Affect Marital Decisions?, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 565 (1995) [hereinafter Marital 
